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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXIII APRIL, 1938 NUMBER 3
MUNICIPAL DEBT READJUSTMENT: PRESENT
RELIEF AND FUTURE POLICY
HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN*
MUNICIPAL DEFAULT: THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM
On January 1, 1933, out of $14,000,000,000 invested in securities of local
state governmental units, $1,000,000,000 were reported to be in default.'
The total funded indebtedness was, at that time, about equally divided be-
tween cities of over 30,000 population and cities of smaller size, towns,
villages, and taxing districts. For the period extending from 1921 to 1932
the average annual rate of issuance of municipal obligations, including state,
totalled over $1,300,000,000 and the rate of retirement was approximately
$500,000,000.2 The amount of municipal and kindred obligations in default
had increased to $1,200,000,000 by the summer of 1933.3 In the early part
of 1934, the amount of such obligations in default had jumped to well over
$2,000,000,000.4 The spread of holdings of municipal securities5 is, perhaps
more significant than the extent of the default, for inevitably repercussions
of municipal financial collapses are felt throughout the economic structure.
Such was the picture of municipal default when the original Municipal
*The writer is indebted to Messrs. Louis Cokin and Ralph P. Needle, third year
students in the Georgetown Law School, for valuable assistance in the preparation of
this article.
'(Apr. 1, 1933) THE BOND BUYER 5. Cf. Rightor, The Bonded Debt of 257 Cities(1932) 21 NAT. MUN. REV. 349.
'(Apr. 1, 1933) TEE BOND BuY 5.
'PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERvicE No. 33, Municipal Debt Defaults (1933) 1.
'Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Judiciary on S. 1868 and H. R. 5950, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 17; see particularly the testimony of Representative Wilcox
beginning at page 12.
'In December 31, 1932, Mr. Carl Chatters, then editor of TEE BoND BuY, esti-
mated that municipal bonds (including state bonds) were distributed as follows:
Individuals having annual income exceeding $5000 $4,500,000,000.00
Corporations except banks and insurance companies 4,000,000,000.00
Sinking funds of states and their political subdivisions 3,380,000,000.00
Banks 2,800,000,000.00
Life, fire and casualty insurance companies 1,000,000,000.00
Fraternal insurance companies 500,000,000.00
Individual investors, income under $5000 900,000,000.00
Other holders 1,420,000,000.00
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Debt Readjustment Act6 was enacted. The debates in the Senate and the
House prior to its passage were long and loud upon the economic need for
municipal. debt readjustment, 7 and the measure, though enjoying adminis-
tration support, was essentially non-partisan in that it derived strong support
from both sides of the aisle.8
Since that time much has happened- The original Act has been invali-
dated9 and a new Municipal Debt Readjustment Act has been enacted into
law.10 With the country's enjoyment of improved business conditions dur-
ing the years 1935-1937 the total amount of municipal obligations in default
has been somewhat reduced,"1 and during that period virtually no new
municipalities have been added to the list of those in default. 12  Despite all
this, history teaches us that depressions are recurrent. It may be that the
ways of history have changed and that depressions now recur as "recessions."
Be that as it may, there is no assurance that municipal defaults may not
soon be on the increase again.
II
CONGRESS ATTEMPTS A SOLUTION
To meet the crises occasioned by mounting defaults, and to afford relief,
both to the distressed municipality and to its creditors, Congress in 1933
began debate upon a proposal which would permit a readjustment of the
debts of municipal and quasi-municipal corporations. Before briefly analyz-
ing the provisions for relief afforded by the first federal statute, it would
be well to note the remedies which creditors of municipal corporations have,
apart from such legislation.
6Sec. 80, amendatory of the National Bankruptcy Act. 48 STAT. 798, 11 U. S. C. A.
§§ 301-303 (1934).
'The debates may be found in 77 CONG. REc. 5469-5488 (1933) and in CONG. REc.,
April 30, 1934, at 7849-7871. Comprehensive statistics may be found in the debates.8One of the principal advocates for the passage of Section 80 was Senator Vandenburg,,,
Republican, of Michigan.
'Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 298 U. S. 513 (1936).
"As §§ 81-84, amendatory of the National Bankruptcy Act, 50 STAT. 654, 11 U. S.
C. A. § 401 (Supp. 1937).
'See letter of Mr. Sanders Shanks, Editor of THE BOND BUYER, to Senator McAdoo
(Febriuary 11, 1938), Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency of the
United States Senate on S. 3255 (Regulation of Over-the-Counter Markets), 75th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1938) at 128.
'See letter of Mr. Shanks, note 11. The following summary showing the spread of
municipal debt defaults, among various types of local governmental units, revised to
March 1, 1938, as reported to THE BOND BUYER, is of interest:
Counties .............................................. 185
Cities and Towns ..................................... 746
School Districts ....................................... 734
Other Districts ....................................... 244
Total Number Municipalities ........................... 1909
Reclamation, Levee, Irrigation and Drainage Districts .... 862
Special Assessment .................................... 308
Grand Total: Municipalities and Special Districts ........ 3079
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There is available to the creditors the prerogative writ of mandamus, a
sort of consolation handed to the holders of obligations of municipal corpora-
tions.13 One must remember, however, that judgment creditors may only
lay hold upon such properties of the corporation as are not devoted to a
"public purpose" and apparently, the courts have had little trouble in finding
some degree of public use for virtually all the property upon which the
creditors may ordinarily hope to levy.14 Like limitations seem to apply to
garnishment.' 5 American courts have been decidedly liberal in granting
mandamus, perhaps because it is apparent that the usual remedies at law
are worth little enough to the creditors. 16 When default results from
dereliction of official duty, or from- mere refusal to pay just obligations,
mandamus seems to be quite adequate.' 7
Unwillingness to pay is not the cause of widespread default in times of
general economic crises. Our problem deals with inability to pay. In such
times, funds in the treasury may be totally required for the corporation's
current operating expenses. If so, bondholders obtain nothing from the
treasury. Constitutional or statutory tax limits may have been reached and
a court is then helpless to compel the municipality to secure funds for debt
payment.'8 Any man's realistic jurisprudence will tell him that depreciated
real estate values and the sympathetic attitude of municipal officials toward
over-taxed citizens can make mandamus wholly innocuous. Officials to
whom writs have been directed have been known to absent themselves from
the jurisdiction; and municipal corporations have been known to delay the
appointment or election of tax collectors.19 Though mandamus proves in-
effective, equity has been reluctant to interfere in the administration of a
"I1n theory, nandamus is available only when other legal remedies prove inadequate.
Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1867); FERRis, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL
PEMEDIES (1926) § 212. For numerous cases, see Fordham, Methods of Enforcing Satis-faction of Obligations of Public Corporations (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 28.1 Fordham, supra note 13, at 29, 30, n. 7-19.
'Id., at 30-32, n. 20-33.
"Sellers v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 239, 24 P. (2d) 666 (1933) (bondholders may force
a city treasurer to fulfill an already issued order of payment and compel such an order
to be issued) ; Symons v. U. S. ex rel. Masters, 252 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 9th 1918)
(and this is true even though funds are not available) ; State ex iel. Vans Agnew v.
Johnson, 112 Fla. 7, 150 So. 111 (1933) (creditors may require collection of levied
taxes) ; MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 2722, n. 50 (creditors
may require the levy of new assessments within the municipality's constitutional or
statutory taxing powers).
"East St. Louis v. United States ex rel. Zebley, 110 U. S. 321 (1884). A reduc-
tion in operating costs may be ordered where expenses are jumped to defeat a creditor's
claim. Deuel County, Nebraska v. First National Bank of Buchanan County, 86 Fed.
264 (C. C. A. 8th 1898).
'It is generally accepted that mandamus may only compel the exercise of an existing
power and that it can create no new power to tax. United States v. County of Macon,
99 U. S. 582 (1878).
"One Kansas county chose its officials upon condition that they should remain in
hiding and appear in the jurisdiction to transact the county's business only by night.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERVICE No. 33, Municipal Debt Defaults (1933) 13.
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public corporation and so does not come to the aid of the city's bond and
warrant holders.20  Even in the cases of waste and misuse of funds, refusal
of officials to collect taxes, or abolition of the taxing district, creditors of
such a corporation will not be entitled to a receiver.21  In Iowa and Mary-
land, by statute, equity courts were authorized to appoint officers to do such
acts as might be necessary to satisfy a writ of mandamus.22  In a few states,
statutes have authorized appointment of a receiver to collect taxes levied for
payment of a defaulting drainage or irrigation district's bonds.23 The virtual
impossibility of a creditor of a defaulting municipality to obtain payment of
the municipality's obligations is thus spelled out.
If then, the creditor finds that enforcement of the municipality's obligations
is denied to him, he must needs resort to some plan for readjustment of
the municipality's obligations which will again put him in possession of an
enforceable right. Realizing this, some state legislatures have created com-
missions with power to control refunding or compromise agreements. Pur-
suant to such authorization, quite a number of cities and their creditors have
been able to agree upon much needed readjustments which have called for
deferring payment, or for reduction of interest rates, or even for the scaling
down of principal. 24 But usually the difficulty in dealing with dissenting
bondholders dooms the prospect of employing any such plans on any effec-
tively wide scale.25 Enforcement of such a state-sanctioned plan against a
recalcitrant minority of the creditors runs afoul of the constitutional pro-
hibition against the impairment of the obligations of a contract.
Various methods suggest themselves as possibilities for controlling an
obdurate minority among a municipality's bondholders. From time to time,
restrictions upon the granting of the discretionary writ of mandamus have
been suggested. In earlier times, however, it has been decided that economic
emergency and even threatened insolvency cannot be deemed sufficient grounds
for denying mandamus to the municipal corporation's creditors.2 6  There
'Consider the similar situation with regard to a defaulting private corporation, where,
upon petition by creditors holding a lien upon such corporation's property, equity will
readily appoint a receiver of the debtor's business and assets. STEVENS, CoaR'ORATIoNS(1936) 765, 766; 2 CLARK, RECEVERS (2d ed. 1929) § 700.
nMarar v. San Jacinto and P. V. Irrigation District, 131 Fed. 780 (C. C. S. D. Cal.
1904) ; Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U. S. 550 (1885) (Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent
in this case suggested the possibility of appointment of a receiver to conserve the assets
of a defaulting public corporation) ; Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472 (1880). See
also Rees v. Watertown, 86 U. S. 107 (1873).
nIowA CODE (1931) § 12453; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby 1924) Art. 75, § 141.
'Statutes of this type are collected in (1933) 46 HARV. L. REv. 1317, 1320, n. 24.
'For several typical plans, see PuBLIc ADMINISTIiATION SERVICE No. "33, Municipal
Debt iDefaults (1933) Appendix A.
'In Alabama it was said that the holders of $2000 worth of bonds out of $952,000
outstanding disrupted a settlement agreeable to holders of $950,000 of bonds. In Coral
Gables an agreement was reached by 90 per cent of the creditors, but ten per cent
prevented any readjustment. Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S.
1868 and H. R. 5950, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934) 14.
'Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705 (U. S. 1866); Little Rock v. United States, 103 Fed.
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seems to be little possibility of exercising any effective control over dis-
senting creditors by restricting the granting of mandamus inasmuch as the
courts have stated that legislative restrictions upon the operation of the
writ would be inoperative. 27
Conceivably, condemnation of the dissenters' bonds under eminent domain
might be considered as a solvent of the problem. However, the difficulties
in the way of such a solution seem insurmountable. In the first place, the
municipality is so situated that it would be next to impossible to procure
funds for such purpose. Presumably, there would be very little difficulty
in complying with the requirement that the taking be for a public.use, inas-
much as "public use" seems to mean little other than "public benefit." 28
Supposing that the public use reqitirement could be spelled out and that funds
for condemnation were available, a most serious' obstacle would be encoun-
tered in the fact that eminent domain proceedings could reach only bonds
or warrants, or their holders, within the same jurisdiction. From these
considerations, it appears that the states are virtually stalemated in their
efforts to effect and enforce a municipal debt readjustment plan.
Because of this situation and because the Bankruptcy Act as then con-
stituted expressly excluded municipal corporations from its purview,2 9 the
Bankruptcy Act was amended by adding new sections designed to invoke
the constitutional power of the Congress to pass uniform laws upon the
subject of bankruptcies for the purpose of making possible the readjustment
of municipal debts. Representative Sumners of Texas introduced into the
House the bill"0 which was enacted into law on May 24, 1934.1
The Sumners Act declared the existence of a national emergency and
provided that "any municipality or other political subdivision" 32 may file
a petition with the local bankruptcy court alleging that the district is unable
to meet its debts as they mature "and that the holders of at least thirty per
cent of its bonds, notes or certificates of indebtedness consent in writing to
the filing of the petition and signify either their willingness that a read-
justment plan be drawn up or else their approval of a plan (or major part
418 (C. C. A. 8th 1900) ; Hammond v. Place, 116 Mich. 628, 74 N. W. 1002 (1898).
'See State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508 (1933);
Dos Amigos, Inc. v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 1313, 131 So. 533 (1930); Victor v. Halstead,
84 Colo. 450, 271 Pac. 185 (1928) ; Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284 (1886) ; Wolff v.
New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358 (1880).
'Cf. Clark v. Nash. 198 U. S. 361 (1905) ; Strickly v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.,
200 U. S. 527 (1906). For other cases see, 1 LEwis, EMINENT DOmAiN (3d ed. 1909)
§ 257, n. 26-30.
'Sec. 4 (a) (b), 36 STAT. 839 (1910), 11 U. S. C. A. § 22 (a) (b) (1926).
'H. R. 5950, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
848 STAT. 798, 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-303 (1934).
="Including (but not hereby limiting the generality of the foregoing), any county,
city, borough, village, parish, town or township, unincorporated tax or special assessment
district, and any school, drainage, irrigation, levee, sewer, or paving, sanitary, port,
improvement or other districts."
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thereof) be submitted by the petitioner." On April 11, 1936, "Sec. 80 Munici-
pal Debt Readjustments" of the Bankruptcy Act (the Sumners-Wilcox Act)
was amended to provide that
"the petition shall state that a plan of readjustment has been prepared,
is filed and submitted with the petition, and that creditors of the taxing
district owning not less than 30 per centum in the case of drainage, irri-
gation, reclamation, and levee districts (except as hereinafter pro-
vided) and owning not less than 5f percentum in the case of all other
taxing districts in amount of the bonds, notes, and certificates of in-
debtedness of the taxing districts affected by the plan, excluding bonds,
notes, or certificates of indebtedness owned, held, or controlled by the
taxing district in a fund or otherwise, have accepted it in writing."33
It was further provided under the terms of the original Municipal Debt
Readjustment Act that the allegations of the petition might be denied and
the district's right to file the petition challenged by holders of five per cent.
of the bonds, notes, or certificates of indebtedness, whereupon the judge
was authorized to decide, without the aid of a jury, whether or not the allega-
tions were sustained by the proofs and then to either approve or dismiss the
petition. Once the petition was approved, the court could enjoin proceed-
ings against the taxing district in other courts.3 4 The court could also compel
the rejection in whole or in part of executory contracts upon which the
district was obligated, saving to the holder of the contract a provable claim
for damages from the resulting breach. However, the judge was precluded
from interfering with any of the political powers of the taxing district or
from interfering with any of its revenues or properties necessary for govern-
mental purposes or with any revenue-producing property of the district "un-
less the plan of readjustment so provides."
With reference to the plan, the Act provided that it
"(1) shall include provisions modifying or altering the rights of
creditors generally, or of any class of them, secured or unsecured, either
through the issuance of new securities of any character or otherwise;
and (2) may contain such other provisions and agreements, not incon-
sistent with this chapter as the parties may desire."
The judge was required to dismiss the proceedings if no plan was sub-
mitted within six months from the date of filing the petition, or if no plan
were approved and accepted within a year from that date, but this latter
period could be extended for an additional year provided the judge found it
necessary so to do. Further, a readjustment plan could be put into effect
temporarily by the court's interlocutory decree to remain in effect until such
'49 STAT. 1203, 11 U. S. C. A. § 303 (1936).
'The bankruptcy judge was authorized to "enjoin or stay, until after final decree,
the commencement or continuance of any judicial proceeding to enforce any lien or
to enforce any levy of taxes."
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time as a plan might be finally confirmed or the proceedings dismissed, pro-
vided, however, that in the event a budget had been adopted in reliance upon
such temporary plan, a dismissal in such budget year was forbidden.
Before amendment, the Sumners-Wilcox Act provided that final confirma-
tion was permitted only when a readjustment plan was approved "by creditors
whose claims have been allowed holding two-thirds in amount of the claims
of each class whose claims have been allowed and would be affected by the
plan, and by creditors holding 662/ per centum in the case of drainage, irri-
gation, reclamation, and levee districts and creditors holding 75 per centum
in the case of all other taxing districts in amount of the claims of all classes
of the taxing district affected by the plan" and by the district. By amend-
ment in 1936, the requirements of a confirmation were modified as follows:
"The plan of readjustment shall not be confirmed until it has been
accepted in writing, filed in the proceedings, by or on behalf of creditors
holding at least 51 per centum in amount of the claims of each class in
the case of drainage, irrigation, reclamation and levee districts and
creditors holding two-thirds in amount of the claims of each class in the
case of all other taxing districts whose claims have been allowed and
would be affected by the plan, and by creditors holding 51 per centum in
the case of all other taxing districts in amount of the claims of all
classes of the taxing district affected by the plan ... "
Before confirming any plan, the judge was required to find that it be
"fair, equitable, and for the best interests of the creditors, and does not dis-
criminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors, and is fairly based upon
the reasonable capacity of the taxing district to pay, and is feasible," that
all expenses incident to the readjustment have been disclosed, that such
expenses be reasonable and that the taxing district be authorized by law to
take any and all action requisite to take execution of the plan. The plan
having been confirmed, the readjustment was to become binding upon all
creditors, irrespective of whether they had filed claims or whether they had
accepted the plan, and upon the taxing district. Finally, the Act provided
that its passage should in no way impair state administrative supervision or
control of political subdivisions; and if supervision of fiscal affairs should
be provided, no petition could be filed and no plan put into operation save
with the approval of the state supervisory agency.3 5
'Even before its passage the constitutionality of the Sumners Act had been questioned
upon several grounds:
(1) that the bankruptcy power may be exercised only in behalf of persons who
are insolvent(2) that the subject of bankruptcies extends only to proceedings contemplating
surrender of the debtor's assets for distribution to his creditors and discharge of
the debtor
(3) that the Act interfered with the right of the states to control their own
political subdivisions.
See James A. McLaughlin, Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the
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THE FIRST MUNICIPAL DEBT READJUSTMENT ACT IN THE LOWER COURTS
On July 17, 1934, the Cameron County Water Improvement District,
the first political subdivision to avail itself of the terms of the Sumners-
Wilcox Act, filed its petition seeking readjustment of its outstanding bonds.
The petition was dismissed as being insufficient and the court, although dis-
cussing the constitutionality of the Act, found it unnecessary to determine
its status as a valid Congressional enactment.8 6
Nearly five months later, in the Federal District Court for California,
the constitutionality of the Act was brought into issue for the first time. 7
After a thorough discussion of the constitutional points involved, District
Judge St. Lure, in an exhaustive opinion found the Act consistent with the
powers granted to Congress. He found the Act within the "subject of
Bankruptcies," uniform in its scope, not lacking in due process, and although
an emergency measure, 38 a valid exercise of legislative powers. Some six
weeks after this decision, the District Court for the Southern District of
California again upheld the validity of the Act basing its decision on' the
California permissive statute,3 9 holding that there was nothing in the Act
that infringed upon unsurrendered state sovereignty.40
Fully two years later, the Cameron County case, upon review by the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cirduit was reversed,41 the court hold-
ig that it was apparent from a reading of the Sumners-Wilcox Act that
it was not intended to interfere with the sovereign rights of the states.
Judiciary on S. 1868 and H. R. 5950, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934), at 126 et seq.;
Morford, Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganization; A Negative View (1933)
19 A. B. A. J. 702, 703; Briggs, Shall Bankruptcy Jurisdiction be Extended to Include
Municipalities and Other Taxable Subdivisions (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 637; Stebbins,
Constitutionality of the Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy Lawu (1933) 17 MARQ.
L. REv. 161.
'lIn re Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 9 Fed. Supp. 103 (S. D.
Texas 1934). The Texas enabling statute had not been passed at this time.
'In re East Contra Costa Irr. Dist., 10 Fed. Supp. 175 (N. D. Cal. 1935).
'For an exhaustive discussion of emergency's part in Constitutional Law, see Maurer,
Emergency Laws (1935) 23 GEo. L. J. 671.
"Chapter f, Section 7a at 5, Extra Session of 1934. "Whenever any taxing district
has heretofore filed or purported or attempted to file a petition under Chap. IX of
the Federal Bankruptcy Statute, all acts and proceedings of such taxing district and
of the governing board or body and of public officers of such taxing district in con-
nection with such petition or proceedings are hereby legalized, ratified, confirmed and
declared valid to all intents and purposes and the power of such taxing district to file
such petition and take such other proceedings is hereby ratified, confirmed and declared,
but all such proceedings taken after the date this Act takes effect shall be taken in
accordance with and pursuant to this Act."
"it re Imperial Irr. District., 10 Fed. Supp. 832 (S. D. Cal. 1935).




MUNICIPAL DEBT READJUSTMENT HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
On May 25, 1936, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
through Mr. Justice McReynolds, held the Sumners-Wilcox Act, relating
to municipal bankruptcy, unconstitutional. 42  The case involved the petition
of a water improvement district in Texas, acting under an enabling statutes
and claiming to be insolvent and unable to meet its debts as they matured,
for confirmation of a plan based on schedules adjusting its obligations in
accordance with the provisions of the Act.44 Owners of more than five per
cent of the outstanding bonds of the district appeared and challenged the
jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the petition. The petition was accord-
ingly dismissed by the Federal District Court4 5 and upon appeal to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was reversed and remanded.4 6 A petition
for a writ of certiorari was then immediately filed and granted by the Court
on April 13, 1936.47
The Court's decision, assuming that the Act was adequately related to the
subject of bankruptcies and not in contravention of the Fifth Amendment,
was based mainly on the invasion of sovereignty of the states and on the
impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution. The decisions under
the taxing clause were used by way of analogy to sustain its holding on the
first ground.
An analysis of these grounds and a consideration of other possible consti-
tutional objections to the validity of the Act will be undertaken to show
the inconsistency of the majority with prior decisions and the validity of
the Act as a Constitutional measure.
A. Analogy to the Taxing Power
First, it is submitted that the tax analogy4" is wholly inapplicable since
the "Power to Tax" has been said to be "the power to destroy",49 while
under this Act the plan is designed to alleviate insolvent municipalities from
Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 298 U. S. 513
(1936). Mr. Justice Cardozo was joined in a vigorous dissent by Chief Justice
Hughes, Justice Stone and Justice Brandeis, 298 U. S. 513, 532.(1936). A rehearing was
denied, 299 U. S. 619 (1936).
'TEX. STAT. (Vernon Supp. 1937) art. 102 §4a.
"48 STAT. 798, 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-303 (1934).
r9 Fed. Supp. 103 (S. D. Tex. 1934).
"681 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 5th 1936).
'1298 U. S. 648 (1936).
""The power to establish 'uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies' can have no
higher rank or importance in our scheme of government than the power 'to lay and
collect taxes'." Ashton v. Cameron County W. I. Dist. No. 1, 298 U. S. 513, 530 (1936).
"M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 318 (U. S. 1819). But see, Mr. Justice Holmes'
dissent in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (1928), to the effect
that "the power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."
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excessive obligations which they are unable at present to meet and in many
cases will never be able to meet. Certainly this is no burden on the taxing
districts as the term is understood in the Reciprocal Immunity tax deci-
sions.5 0 The Act, on the contrary, provides for a plan whereby the sub-
divisions may relieve themselves of that burden which Chief Justice Marshall
feared Congress might impose.51 However, let the tax analogy, for all that
it is worth, be applied and pursued to the illogical end-the Act would still
appear to be constitutional. The majority opinion inexplicably failed to take
into consideration the long line of decisions dealing with the "consent" of
the sovereign to be taxed. The Court has-never hesitated in upholding fed-
eral tax assessments on state instrumentalities or state assessments on federal
units when the consent of the sovereign was present.52 To carry the doctrine
of consent further, we should consider the incidence of the Eleventh Amend-
ment whereby, despite prohibition against the entertainment by the federal
courts of suits by citizens of one state against another state, it is well
settled that a state may waive its sovereign immunity by voluntary appear-
ance. 5 3 It seems clear that either the state or the Federal Government may
waive its sovereignty and consent to legislation, which, without such con-
sent, would be unconstitutional. 54
"',. . instrumentalities employed for carrying on the operations of their [state]
governments . . .should not be liable to be crippled, much less defeated by the taxing
power of another government .. " Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 125 (U. S. 1870).
"A tax is understood to be a charge, a pecuniary burden." United States v. Railroad
Company, 17 Wall. 322, 326 (U. S. 1872). Cf. "The right to tax the contract [with
a state] to any extent . . . however inconsiderable, is a burden on the operations of
government." Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 468 (U. S. 1829).
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
'Baltimore Nat. Bank v. State Tax Commission of Maryland, 297 U. S. 209 (1936);
Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall. 573 (U. S. 1865) ; United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175 (1936) ; Owensboro v. Owensboro Nat. Bank, 173 U. S. 664 (1899).
"'The immunity from suit belonging to a State which is respected and protected
by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial power of the United States, is a
personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure." Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436,
447 (1883).
"Although a state may not be sued without its consent, such immunity is a privilege
which may be waived, and hence where a state voluntarily becomes a party to a cause
and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot
escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh
Amendment." Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U. S. 273, 284 (1906). "Im-
munity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment is a personal privilege which may
be waived." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 24 (1933). See also, DoBmE, FEDERAL
PROCEDURE (1928) 533, § 132; 5 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTISE JURISDICTION AND PRO-
CEDURE (1931) 223, § 3043; 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIoNs (8th ed. 1927) 22;
3 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1925) 1384.
"Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17 (1905) (state regulations concerning
intoxicating liquor when imported into a state); Wilkerson v. Rohrer, 140 U. S. 545(1891) (subjecting of intoxicating liquors transported into a state to state laws);
Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936) (state control of prison made goods in inter-
state commerce).
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B. The Preservation of Duad Sovereignty
The argument of the majority as to the preservation of the dual sov-
ereignty in our federal form of government seems fictional and unreal in that
the operation of Section 80 of the Bankruptcy Act is limited to matters over
which the "sovereign rights" of states cannot extend, i.e., alteration, com-
promise, or adjustment of the outstanding obligations of state subdivisions.55
Where, then, is the much abhorred invasion of states rights? However, if
doubt still exists as to the impairment of state sovereignty, then the doctrine
9 f consent renders the dual sovereignty argument unconvincing.
5 6
Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution providing that "no State
shall pass any law impairing the obligations of Contracts" is wholly inapplica-
ble to Section 80 of the Bankruptcy Act. It is argued that a state has no
power to impair existing obligations of its subdivisions57 and, therefore, by
its enabling statutes,58 it is doing indirectly what it is prohibited from doing
directly.59 This line of reasoning is questionable in that Section 80 does not
authorize the states through their own legislatures to impair existing obliga-
tions. If contracts are impaired, the impairment is occasioned by the fed-
eral courts acting under an act of the Congress: the state merely authorizes its
subdivisions to file a petition.60 Impairment is not forbidden unless effected
by the states themselves and the granting of the petition by the courts of
the United States is the efficient cause of the release. There being no restraint
on the Congress in this respect,6' the argument of impairment must fall.
C. The Doctrine of Uniformity
The Act is not lacking in uniformity as provided for in Article I, Section
'U. S. CONsT. Art. I, 4 10, cl. 1. "A state has authority to pass a bankrupt [in-
solvency] law provided such law does not impair the obligations of contracts." Sturges
v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat, 122, 207 (U. S. 1819). "So long as there is no national
bankrupt act, each State has full authority to pass insolvent laws . . . provided it does
not impair the obligation of existing contracts; . . ." Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454,
457 (1892).
CoIt is of passing interest to note that briefs aonici curiae were filed on behalf of ten
states in support of the constitutionality of the Sumners-Wilcox Act. Are we to force
immunity upon states against their own will?
"Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819).
"Five states have enacted this type of statute: Arizona, California, Florida, Ohio, and
Texas.
'Ashton v. Cameron County W. I. Dist. No. 1, 298 U. S. 513, 532 (1936).
'Apparently there is no authority for either view on this topic. See Brief for 'Re-
spondent, p. 16.
"'"Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the authority of the Congress." Norman
v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 294 U. S. 240, 307 (1935). New York v. United States,
257 U. S. 591 (1922) (existing rate contracts are subject to subsequent schedules by
I.C.C.) ; Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 (1899) (previous
contracts subject to anti-trust legislation of Congress) ; Philadelphia B. & W. R. R.
v. Schubert, 224 U. S. 603 (1912) (Employers' Liability Act held applicable to con-
tracts made before its passage).
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8 of the Constitution. 62  The uniformity required, is geographical and not
personal.63 The mere fact that the Act is applicable only to such public cor-
porations as have the capacity under the laws of their mother state does not
make it one lacking in uniformity; for if capacity exists, the rule is uniform
for all. 64
D. The Incidence of the Fifth Amendment
There is no violation of the Fifth Amendment 6  involved in applying the
Municipal Debt Readjustment Act. It is questionable whether there is a
deprivation of property in any real sense when secured creditors are com-
pelled by a law, such as Section 80, to accept something which the court finds
is equivalent to their contract rights.66 Unlike the Frazier-Lemke case 
6 7
wherein Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act was declared unconstitutional
as repugnant to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,8" this
situation does not present itself in proceedings under the Municipal Debt
Readjustment Act. In the former case, property of the mortgagee was
taken and given back to the mortgagor without even the right of the mort-
gagee to bid the property in it an open sale-clearly a taking without due
process. However, inasmuch as municipal property, governmental in nature,
cannot be levied upon or sold for municipal debts, 69 the reorganization under
Section 80 does not involve the insurmountable obstacle of Section 75.
Therefore, any'attempt to apply the decision in the Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank case7 ° to the Municipal Debt Readjustment Act for the purpose
of questioning its constitutionality seems unwarranted. There is a substan-
tial difference between bankruptcy provisions, legitimately exercised, effect-
'"Congress shall have power to establish uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States."
"Hanover Nat. Bank. v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181 (1902); Lehigh Carriage Co. v.
Stengel, 95 Fed. 637 (C. C. A. 6th 1899).
'"Notwithstanding the requirement as to uniformity the bankruptcy acts of Con-
gress may recognize the laws of the state, although such recognition may lead to
different results in different states." Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 613 (1918).
" "No person shall be .. .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law, . . ." U. S. CoNsw. Amend. V.
"'. .. in bankruptcy when a 'corporation' agreement with the bankrupt debtor, if
assented to by the required majority of creditors, is made binding .on the non-assenting
minority, in no just sense do such governmental regulations deprive a person of his
property without due process of law." Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S.
527, 536 (1883).
'Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935).
"The bankruptcy power . . . is subject to the Fifth Amendment" Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 589 (1935). See the earlier suggestion to
the contrary: "Limitations contained in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution are
not restrictive upon the bankruptcy power." Gerdes, Constitutionality of Sec. 77B of
the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 196, 207.
'Townsend v. Greeley, S Wall. 326 (U. S. 1866); City of Flora v. Naney, 136
Ill. 45. 26 N. E. 645 (1891); COOLEY, MUNICIPAL. CoRPoRATIO s (1914) 468; ELLIOT,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1925) 407, § 92.
¢'295 U. S. 555 (1935) (the Frazier-Lemke Act declared unconstitutional as a vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment).
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ing consequential injury or abrogating existing contracts and a direct appro-
priation of property belonging to an individual,7' as was attempted by Section
75 of the Bankruptcy Act.72  Section 80, in its attempt to ease the burden
of over-bonded state subdivisions, does merely what is within the very
essence of a bankruptcy law, namely, equalize distribution of a debtor's assets
among his creditors.73 Therefore, it is difficult to see how any objection to
the Act's validity on the ground of lack of due process can be sustained in
view of the Railroad Reorganization case 74 upholding Section 77 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.75
E. The Fear of the Future
The fear of the majority in the Ashton caseT0 as to the possible future
expansion of the Bankruptcy Clause to embrace the states themselves and
thus destroy their sovereignty and make them submissive to the will of
Congress is entirely without basis.77  The Court was not called upon to
decide there, nor will it be under the Second Municipal Bankruptcy Act, the
possibility of state bankruptcy. However, when that occasion arises, there
is room for argument that the bankruptcy concept does not include the
states themselves. Surely, the states could not be subject to involuntary
proceedings, since a suit against a state without its consent is prohibited
"'Closely allied to the objection we have just been considering is the argument-
that the legal tender acts were prohibited by the spirit of the Fifth Amendment, that
provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation and not
to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power." Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U. S. 457, 551 (1870)
'47 STAT. 1470, 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (1933).
"The very essence of a national bankrupt system is the doing away with preexisting
contracts, the prevention of preferences among creditors allowed by the common law,
the distribution of the assets of a debtor, upon the principle that equality is equity
among creditors. . . .Upon this subject there is no constitutional inhibition imposed
upon C-bngress and it can exercise the full powers of sovereignty ... " In re Vogler,
Fed. Cas. No. 16,986 at 1250 (W. D. N. C. 1873).
'"'The Constitution, as it many times has been pointed out, does not in terms pro-
hibit Congress from impairing the obligation of contracts as it does the states ...
Speaking generally, it may be said that Congress, while without power to impair the
obligation of contracts by laws acting directly and independently to that end, undeniably,
has authority to pass legislation pertinent to any of the powers conferred by the Con-
stitution, however it may operate collaterally or incidentally to impair or destroy the
obligation of private contracts. . . .And under the express power to pass uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies, the legislation is valid though drawn with the direct
aim and effect bf relieving insolvent persons in whole or in part from the payment of
their debts." Continental Illinois Nat. Bank v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S.
648, 680 (1935).
'47 STAT. 1474 (1933) 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (1934).
'298 U. S. 513 (1936).
'The Congress clearly negatives the intention of invasion of state sovereignty by
providing that "nothing contained in this chapter *shall be construed to limit or impair
the power of any state to control by legislation or otherwise any municipality or any
political subdivision of or in such state in the exercise of its political or governmental
powers including expenditures therefor. Section 83(i) of the Bankruptcy Act, 50 STAT.
659, 11 U. S. C. A. § 403(i) (Supp. 1937). A similar provision can be found in the
earlier Act. Section 80 (k), 48 STAT. 802 (1934).
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under the Federal Constitution. 8 In public law, the state is a quasi-sov-
ereign; not so its local governmental units. This is borne out by decisions
under the Eleventh Amendment allowing suits against such governmental
units to be maintained contrary to their will, whereas the same suits brought
against the state would have been dismissed. 79  Thus, Justice McReynolds'
fear of vanishing state lines seems rather unwarranted.
F. Bankruptcy-An Expanding Concept
The foregoing arguments are all based upon the assumption that the
Municipal Debt Readjustment Act was one properly within "the subject
of bankruptcies." Doubt may be expressed as to the validity of such an
assumption. But bankruptcy is an expanding concept and this is best
demonstrated by a brief survey of this process of expansion.
To that elusive individual, "the average man", bankruptcy conveys one
absorbing idea-that some poor fellow staggering under the burden of crush-
ing debt is to be released from his bondage. If one surveys but cursorily
the evolution of the idea of bankruptcy, he cannot help but learn that the
idea of the debtor's release from bondage is but one phase of bankruptcy's
all embracing purpose. Indeed, the idea of release may in many instances
be but incidental to the principal purpose of particular bankruptcy legisla-
tion.80
"U.. S. CONST. Amend. XI.' "A state cannot be sued by a citizen of another state,
or of a foreign state." Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890). Accord: I re Quarles,
158 U. S. 532 (1894) ; In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887) ; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S.
52 (1886). 5 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTISE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1931) 223,
§ 3043.
"'Neither public corporations nor political subdivisions are clothed with that im-
munity from suit which belongs to the state alone by virtue of its sovereignty." Hopkins
v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636, 645 (1911); Norris v. Montezuma
Valley Irrig. Dist., 248 Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 8th 1918) (political subdivision subject to
mandamus) ; Tyler County v. Town, 23 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 5th 1928) (local gov-
ernmental units subject to equity proceedings): See DOBME, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928)
532, § 132.
*'This is true, of course, of municipal bankruptcy legislation.
Ancient peoples apparently had a crude conception of the debtor release phase of the
bankruptcy idea. The Israelites had fixed upon every seven years as a sabbatical
year of release. "At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a release. And this
is the manner of release: Every creditor that lendeth aught unto his neighbor shall
release it. He shall not exact it of his neighbor or his brother; because it is called
the Lord's release. Of a foreigner thou mayest exact it again; but that which is thine
with thy brotherly hand shall release; save when there shall be no more poor among
you." DEUT. 15. The Roman law had, in the time of Julius Caesar, repudiated the
idea that laws pertaining to insolvent debtors should be regarded as criminal statutes
when Cessio Bonorurn provided that when an insolvent debtor had turned over his prop-
erty for the benefit of his creditors in all good faith, he should not be liable either to
capital punishment, imprisonment nor slavery, as had theretofore been his fate. See
the CODE OF JUSTINIAN, Djq. 2, 4, 25, 48, 19, Nov. 4, 3. Of course, Cessio Bonorum
was not a bankruptcy law inasmuch as its operation could not be invoked by creditors
in the first instance. It more closely resembled a voluntary assignment for the benefit
of creditors for it was purely a voluntary proceeding on the debtor's part. The first
English Bankruptcy Act, 1542, 34 Hy. VIII was a criminal statute in effect, going
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As the result of the recommendations of Charles Pinckney and John
Rutledge the power "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bank-
ruptcies" was incorporated into Article I as Clause 4 of Section 8 of the
Federal Constitution.8 ' Congress first legislated on the subject of bank-
ruptcy in 180082 The Act, in its terms, was limited to five years and em-
braced bankers, brokers, underwriters, and factors, in addition to traders.
It is interesting to note that no provision was made for voluntary proceed-
ings or discharge of the debtor.8 3 This Act was short-lived, and due to
considerable dissatisfaction with its operation, was repealed in 1803.84 Con-
gress reentered the field in 1841. This statute, for the first time, allowed
voluntary proceedings and its benefits were extended to all individuals, 5
it was repealed in 1843 after the statute fell upon evil days-the period of
the most heated debate centering around the states rights controversy.8 6 In
1867, Congress made a third attempt.8 7 Under the terms of this Act, it
was far too easy to be adjudged a bankrupt, but the multiplication of qualifi-
cations made it almost impossible to obtain a discharge. Attached to its
administration was a decidedly vicious fee system which, in many instances,
consumed the corpus of the fund.s8 More interesting than the Act itself is
the Amendment of 1874,89 wherein for the first time Congress, under its
upon the premise that all bankruptcies are fraudulent. The next acts, 13 Eliz. 1570
and of 1 and 23 James I, in general simply amplified and made more definite the first
statute. By. Elizabeth's law bankruptcy was confined to merchants, brokers and traders,
a limitation which, in its main features, was to continue in England and America until
well into the nineteenth century. Until the reign of Anne there was no provision for
discharging the bankrupt from his remaining debts. Even the right to new property
acquired by the bankrupt was, under Elizabeth's statute, immediately vested in his
creditors, old and new. In the English law of 1705, 4 Anne c. 17, the prominence of
the criminal idea was abandoned and a discharge was granted to the bankrupt for the
first time.
"WARREN," BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935) 5. In the debates
and writings contemporary with the Constitutional Convention only James Madison
seems to have set down his ideas on the scope and meaning of the Bankruptcy Clause
where he stressed the idea that the clause was to be regarded as intimately connected
with the regulation of commerce, as designed to prevent frauds and to benefit the com-
mercial class of creditors and debtors. See THE FEDERALIST (Lodge ed.) No. 42.
"2 STAT. 19.
'Apparently in this respect the colonial statutes had not adopted the rudimentary ideas
on discharge found in 4 Anne c. 17 (1705).
"The reasons for repeal of the Act of 1800 usually assigned are: a) difficulty of
travel to the distant and unpopular Federal Courts; b) small dividends paid to creditors,
most of debtors being already in jail; c) Rich debtors used act to obtain discharge
from debts. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935) 19: "the
fear of the people at the time that the Federal Government was drawing around their
necks the cords of a strongly centralized and domineering government coupled with the
uprisings at the time of the Alien Sedition laws brought about the repeal of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 before its destined objectives were perceived." See 1 REZTING-
TON, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1934) 5.
"5 STAT. 440.
'See WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935) 68-69.
"14 STAT. 517.
'See In re Wells, 114 Fed. 222 (D. C. Mo. 1902).
118 STAT. 178. o
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power "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies," introduced
into our bankruptcy law a provision for composition agreements between
debtor and creditor. Congress repealed the*third Act in 1878.
In 1898 the present Bankruptcy Law"° was enacted including within the
scope of its operation as voluntary bankrupts "any person who owes debts
except a corporation" and as "involuntary bankrupts" any natural person
except a wage-earner or a person engaged chiefly in farming or in tillage
of the soil, any unincorporated company, and any corporation engaged princi-
pally in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, mining or mercantile
pursuits, owing debts to the amount of $1000 or over. "Private bankers but
not national banks or banks incorporated under state or territorial laws" could
be adjudged involuntary bankrupts. By s'ection A "a partnership during the
continuation of the partnership business or after its dissolution and before
the final settlement thereof may be adjudged a bankrupt."
In 1910, Congress excluded from the benefits of the Act of 1898 as
amended (whether as voluntary or involuntary bankrupts) municipal, rail-
road, insurance, and banking corporations.91 In 1932, building and loan asso-
ciations were also denied the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act.92 Apparently,
railroad, insurance, and banking corporations had sought the benefits of the
Act, but no case seems to have arisen in which a municipal corporation
'sought to avail itself of the privilege.
On an eventful day, March 3, 1933, Congress enacted Section 74 pro-
viding that "any person excepting a corporation may file a petition stating
that he is insolvent or unable to meet his debts as they mature and that he
desires to effect a composition or an extension of time to pay his debts."9 3
The groundwork was thereby laid for Sections 75, 77, enacted contempor-
aneously with Section 74, and for Section 77B, soon to follow. Section 75,
the Frazier-Lemke Act,9 4 designed to offer agrarian relief with its ingenious
scheme of taking the property of the debtor from the secured creditor and
handing it back to the debtor instead of distributing it to the creditors as a
class, was foreign to all hitherto conceived ideas of bankruptcy and compo-
sition. It died in the Supreme Court as violative of the Fifth Amendment.95
The amended Act of 19 34 96 cured the defect of the first Act in that, "while it
'30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 1.
"36 STAT. 839 (1910).
'47 STAT. 47 (1932), 11 U. S. C. A. § 22 (1934).
047 STAT. 1467 (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. § 202 (a) (1934).
'47 STAT. 1470 (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (1934). For an historical survey of
early composition laws indicating that there was English legislation as early as 1769
modeled after even earlier French legislation see Glenn, Essentials of Bagnkruptcy:
Prevention of Fraud, and Control of Debtor (1937) 23 VA. L. REv. 373, 378-9.
'Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935).
"48 STAT. 1289, 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (1934).
0
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did affect the interest of the lienholders in many ways" it did not hand
Blackacre back to the debtor.97
Came then Section 77 with its plan for- "Reorganization of Railroads
Engaged in Inter-State Commerce. '9 s *The historical jurist would tell us
that the remedies which the section affords to railroads and the procedure
regulating the same are frankly foreign to "bankruptcy," for nowhere can
be found the slightest suggestion that under any circumstances, the railroad
may be adjudicated a bankrupt. There were those who thought the Act
could not withstand the test of constitutionality."9  They had to learn that
it could happen here.100 Congress enacted Section 77B on June 7, 1934.101
More novel devices were introduced with Section 77B to take care of all
distressed corporations with the exception of municipal, insurance, and bank-
ing corporations, building and loan associations, and such railroads as came
under Section 77. In Section 77B the Congress went a long step further by
permitting the courts to take jurisdiction over corporations which are not
insolvent in the present bankruptcy sense, and it authorized the adjustment
of the rights of stockholders of such corporations' 02  Section 77B has been
sustained innumerable times in the lower federal courts despite numerous
assaults upon the section on various constitutional grounds.10 3
Thus it is seen that "bankruptcy" has been an ever-expanding concept, both
as to the form of relief offered and as to the classes of persons (natural and
artificial) relieved. In light of such a history, municipal debt readjustment
would hardly be either an alarming or an unreasonable further expansion of
the bankruptcy concept.
"'Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U. S. 440
(1937).
"47 STAT. 1474, 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (1933).
"See Stebbins, Constitutionality of the Recent Amendment to the Bankruptcy Law(1933) 17 MARQ. L. REv. 161. Rodgers and Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corpo-
rations under Sec. 77 (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 571: Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganiza-
tion Act (1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 18.
'Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago R. I. and P. Ry., 294
U. S. 648 (1935).
'48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (Supp: 1934).
"'Weiner, Corporate Reorganizations Section 77B (1934) 34 COL. L. RPv. 1173;
Gerdes, Constitutionality of Section 77B (1935) 12 N. Y., U. L. Q. REv. 96; Garrison,
Power of Congress Over Corporate Reorganization (1933) 19 VA. L. Rav. 343; Swaine,
Federal Le.qislation for Corporate Reorganization (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 698. See In re
33 North Michigan Ave. Building Corp., 84 F. (2d) 936 (C. C. A. 7th 1936), cert. denied,
Rotfeld v. 333 North Michigan Ave. Bldg. Corp. 57 Sup. Ct. 194 (1936) ; Campbell v.
Allegheny Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th 1935), cert. denied 296 U. S. 581 (1935) ;
Grand Blvd. Inventment Co. v. Straus, 78 F. (2d) 180 (C. C. A. 8th 1935; In re Pierce-
Arrow Sales Cori. 10 Fed. Supp. 776 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
'Continental Ins. Co. v. Louisiafia Oil Refining Corp., 89 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 5th
1937) ; In re Prima Co., 88 F. (2d) 785 (C. C. A. 7th 1937) ; Grand Boulevard Inv. Co.
v. Strauss, 78 F. (2d) 180 (C. C. A. 8th 1935) ; Campbell v. Allegheny Corp., 75 F. (2d)




Soon after the Ashton decision, the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and
Reorganization of the House Judiciary Committee undertook the admittedly
difficult task of drafting a bill which would accomplish the twofold purpose
of retaining the desired results of the recently declared unconstitutional
Sumners-Wilcox Municipal Debt Readjustment Act and, at the same time,
one "that would pass muster over there in the big white building."10 4
What are the carefully worded legislative differences between the new Act
and the statute involved in the Ashton case and what are the possible effects
of these differences in determining the constitutionality of a Municipal Debt
Readjustment Plan?
In the first place, Section 80 was limited in its scope to "political sub-
divisions" and hence any district that does not fall-into this class was without
the statute, and if it does fall within this class it must be denied relief under
the decision in the Ashton'case.0 5 The new Act does not mention "political
subdivisions" but classifies the various types of districts into six classes.106 It
will now be possible for the courts to pass upon them as distinct groups.
Subsection 6 seems to be the only group that would necessarily fall within the
definition of "political subdivision," the other groups in many states not
being considered as such. 0 7 A fortiori, the "saving clause" in the second Act
will play an important role in contrast to its part in the first Act where its
..Hearings before Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the House Committee on the
Judiciary on H. R. 5403, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 101.
"In re Imperial Irrigation District, 87 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 9th 1936).
"O6'(1) Drainage, drainage and levee, levee, levee and drainage, reclamation, water
irrigation, or other similar districts, commonly designated as agricultural improvement
districts or local improvement districts, organized or created for the purpose of con-
structing, improving, maintaining, and operating certain improvements or projects de-
voted chiefly to the improvement of lands therein for agricultural purposes; or (2)
local improvement districts such as sewer, paving, sanitary, or other similar districts,
organized or created for the purposes designated by their respective names; or (3)
local improvement districts such as road, highway, or other similar districts, organized
or created for the purpose of grading, paving or otherwise improving public streets,
roads, or highways; or (4) public-school districts or public-school authorities organized
or created for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating public schools or
public-school facilities; or (5) local improvement districts such as port navigation,
or other similar districts, organized or created for the purpose of constructing, im-
proving, maintaining and operating ports and port facilities; or (6) any city, town,
village, borough, township, or other municipality." 50 STAT. 654, 11 U. S. C. A. § 401
(1937).
'
7Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. First State Bank of. Cheraw, 84 Colo. 157, 268 Pac. 523
(1928) (irrigation district); Colorado Inve~tment and Realty Co. v. Riverview Drain-
age Dist., 83 Colo. 468, 266 Pac. 501 (1928) (drainage district); Davis v. Commis-
sioners of Sewage of Louisville, 13 F. Supp. 672 (N. D. Ky. 1936) (sewers and drains).
Contra: Mokovitch v. Independent School District, 177 Minn. 446, 225 N. W. 292
(1929) (school district); Martin v. Dade Much Land Co., 95 Fla. 530, 116 So. 449
(1928) (drainage district) ; Northrup v. Jackson, 273 Mich. 20, 262 N. W. 641 (1935)
(sewerage district).
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insertion was mere surplusage, as the Sumners-Wilcox Act applied to only
one group, "political subdivisions.' 0 8  A further attempt to get away from
the deadliness of the term "political subdivision" is evidenced by the omis-
sion of the term "county" from the supposedly curative second Act; the
drafters were aware of the necessity of this unit as an arm of the sovereign
state. 10 9 Secondly, the new Act takes pains to make it clear that effect is
to be given only to a voluntary composition agreement between majority
creditors and the debtor district. This, it was believed, would dispel the fear
of "interference"." 0 It is distinctly stated that only by consent of the insol-
vent may any proceedings be instituted, and in no case can the defaulting
district be brought into court against its will or have any plan but its own
confirmed."L - Thirdly, the procedure under the second Act is virtually the
same as that of the first. The only procedural change that might have any
bearing in determining the validity of Section 81 is the requirement that
owners "of not less than fifty percent in amount of the securities affected
by the plan have accepted it in writing" prior to the petition, as against the
provision in the now invalidated Sumners-Wilcox Act that "not less than
thirty percent in amount of securities affected by the plan in the case of
drainage, irrigation and reclamation districts" shall have agreed in writ-
ing."12  The new Act nowhere in its provisions has circumvented the hold-
ing in the Ashton case that the state enabling statutes are, in effect, impair-
ments of existing contracts and, therefore, the exercise of a power forbidden
to the states."13
""A county is a political subdivision par excellence. State governments would con-
tinue to function if there were no municipalities or taxing districts, the former -are
mere creations of the State, and the latter are generally representative of the land
owners, but a county undoubtedly is a part of the sovereign government of the State.
No State, as we know it, could function without a county (or parish). The State
looks to the county to provide it with a jury, with a Sheriff, with a court house, with
a clerk of the courts, with a tax collector. These county officers are also state officers
and they perform governmental functions having to do with the State." Black, Has
Congress Circumvented the Ashton Decision? (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 683, 684.10
"If obligations of states or other political subdivisions may be subjected to the
interference here attempted, they are no longer free to manage their own affairs, the
will of Congress prevails over them." Ashton v. Cameron County Water Imp. Dis-
trict No. 1, 298 U. S. 513, 531 (1936) (italics supplied).
°50 STAT. 655, 11 U. S. C. A. § 403 (1937).
"'It is interesting to note the comment of Representative Wilcox of Florida, the
staunchest advocate of municipal reorganization. "I am confident that if this act is
presented to the Supreme Court in a case in which the vast majority of creditors
have agreed to a simple plan of adjustment, so that they can understand that it is
not designed to interfere with any governmental function, that they will qualify and
distinguish that first decision [Ashton case] and uphold this act, even as to a sub-
division of a State government." Hearings before Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the
House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5403, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 145.
1'50 STAT. 654, 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 401-404 (Supp. 1937).
"'U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10.
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VI
THE NEW ACT MEETS ITS FIRST TEST.
In the first decision involving the new Municipal Bankruptcy Act 1 4 it was,
like its predecessor, declared unconstitutional." 5 The court ruled that an
irrigation district was a political subdivision and, inasmuch as the Supreme
Court had outlawed all units falling within this category from participating
under the Debt Readjustment Plan," 6 found itself bound to follow this
precedent set by the Ashton case. Two appeals, one by the United States
in support of the constitutionality of the act, and one by the Irrigation Dis-
trict on behalf of its right to petition in accordance with the provisions of the
Act, were immediately filed with the Supreme Court.117 The Court granted
the appeals on February 28, 1938; the cases will be argued together some-
time in April, 1938.
VII
How DIFFERENT IS THE NEW ACT FROM THE OLD?
Assuming that the Ashton case will not be reversed, what is the practical
effect of the new Act? The federal courts in applying Section 81 will have
to determine the status of each agency which seeks relief. Is it governmental
or proprietary in nature? The answer will depend upon the state statute as
construed by the courts of that state," s and will determine the particular
petitioning agency's right to rely on the Act. The opinions in the state
courts are in irresoluble conflict as to whether their agencies exercise purely
governmental powers, solely proprietary functions, or a combination of the
two."
9
This difficulty in applying the new Act may well be insurmountable. In
the case of an agency exercising both governmental and proprietary functions,
'In re Lindsay-Strathmore Irrig. Dist., 21 Fed. Supp. 129 (S. D. Cal. 1937).
'Ashton v. Cameron County Water Impr. Dist. No. 1, 298 U. S. 513 (1936) (hold-
ing the First Municipal Debt Reorganization Act unconstitutional by a 5-4 decision).
'It is interesting to note the concluding paragraph of District Judge Yankwich's
decision. "As a student, exercising private judgment, I agree with the conclusion of
the dissenters [in the Ashton Case] that immunity from interference through federal
bankruptcy laws, even if applicable to states, should not be extended to state instru-
mentalities, whether they be municipal, quasi-municipal or public corporations. I-How-
ever, as a judge of a lower court, I cannot exercise private judgment, but must follow
the opinion of the majority, which, as I read it, extends the immunity to all govern-
mental agencies created by a state for the performance of public functions." 21 Fed.
Supp. 129, 135 (S. D. Calif. 1937).
"TUnited States v. Bekins; Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District v. Bekins, 5
U. S. L. W. 748 (1938).
'aThe settled decisions of a state's highest court as to the extent and character
of the powers which its political and municipal -organizations possess are binding upon
the federal courts. Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169 (1933); Morehead v. New York,
298 U. S. 587 (1936).
'"See, Legislation (1937) 25 GEo. L. J. 98, 102-105.
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obligations incurred in the exercise of governmental functions must be
segregated from obligations incurred in the exercise of 15roprietary functions.
Even though various units may perform some proprietary acts, they will
necessarily be denied relief altogether since they were dubbed "political sub-
divisions" by their respective state courts. Even a proprietary agency may,
as an incident to its proprietary functions, perform some governmental
duties. It will be almost impossible, to readjust the interrelated financial
transactions of these dual capacity agencies with any apparent success with-
out encroaching upon the sovereignty of the state. The "saving clause"1 20
of the new Act may fall short of its avowed purpose if the Court should find
that one section of the Act cannot stand without the other.1' 1 The new
legislation will thus fall heir to the same infirmity which paralyzed its prede-
cessor in the courts.
The fundamental weaknesses of the Sumners-Wilcox Act as depicted in
the Ashton case, impairment of contracts by the states, and invasion of state
sovereignty, have not been cured in the new Municipal Debt- Readjustment
Act insofar as it is applied to political subdivisions of, a state. However, it
is submitted that (A) upon a re-examination of the constitutional points in-
volved, (B) the fact that the court is interpreting a new act and, (C) the
possibility of a "liberal" interpretation by a court numbering only three of
the members who constituted the majority when the Ashton case was handed
down, the sweeping decision of the Ashton case will be either narrowed in
scope or reversed altogether.
VIII
AFTER READJUSTMENT - WHAT?
Admitting the economic need for municipal debt readjustment and admit-
ing the possibility of a reversal of the Ashton decision, it must be apparent
that readjustment with nothing more is inadequate as a legal method of ac-
complishing the desired objectives of economic and social engineering in the
field of credit as it pertains to municipalities and other units of local govern-
ment. Indeed, unless the period of debt readjustment is followed by work-
able state plans for control of local credit, we may find ourselves in more
serious predicaments than if we keep our hands off the problem and forget
about legislation authorizing municipal debt readjustments.
"'... If any provision of this chapter, or the application thereof to any such taxing
agency or district or class thereof or to any circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder
of the chapter, or the application of such provision to any other or different circmn-
stances, shall not be affected by such holding." 50 STAT. 654, 11 U. S. C. A. § 401
(Supp. 1937).
m'I"the saving clause] provides a rule of construction which may sometimes aid in
determining that [legislative] intent. But it is an aid merely; not an inexorable com-
mand." Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 (1924) ; Domling, Dissection of Statutes
(1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 298.
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It must be apparent that confirmation of a. plan of readjustment by a
court of bankruptcy can offer no assurance that the indebted taxing district
would not, upon the termination of the plan's operation, repeat the practices
that brought it to the brink of financial ruin. True, a readjustment plan
may provide for strict supervision of municipal finances for some period
following discharge, but it cannot set tip permanent machinery designed to
insure the continued availability of low-cost borrowing or avoidance of
future defaults. Existing statutory provisions for the administrative super-
vision of local credit, whether in the guise of administrative supervision
of local indebtedness or administrative supervision of local tax bases
and of expenditures or administrative supervision of general fiscal manage-
ment, are woefully inadequate. 122
The diversity of conditions, economic, social, and political, renders it im-
possible to suggest any single workable system of administrative supervision
of local credit suitable for all states. But, this difficulty does not in any way
diminish the need for each state to determine what it can do to insure that
the defaulting municipality shall not return to improper and unsound finan-
cial practices and that steps should be taken to place the municipality's
credit, structure upon a sound basis. With respect to local governmental units
other than true municipal corporations (cities), the objections, particularly
the legal objections, would seem to be less appalling, at least with regard to
such units of local government as can be labeled "mere agents of the state"
or "political subdivisions". With respect to "true, municipal corporations",
the problem presents a challenge to legislative and judicial ingenuity, but it
is, none the less, a challenge which should be met.
There are, of course, certain "practical" objections to state administrative
supervision of local credit-such as the argument that for local political
influence and incompetence would be substituted state political influence and
incompetence. Of course, public office, whether appointive or elective,
can never be wholly free from politics and incompetence, yet it would seem
that state appointment would afford adequate opportunity to obtain the
services of financial administrators quite capable and, very likely, less par-
tisan.1 23  It may be urged that state administrative bodies lack contact with
purely local conditions. To this it can be answered that these allegedly
"purely local" conditions are scarcely "purely local" since the credit standing
of one local unit invariably profoundly affects the credit standing of all local
'See Comment, Administration of Municipal Credit (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924, 982-
995; Sauer, An Experiment in Municipal Financing: Factual Background of Cameron
County Improvement District No. One (1936) 5 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1.
'See Leslie, State Control of Local Expenditure-the Indiana Plan (1932) 49 STONE
AND WEBSTER J. 28, wherein it is suggested that in Indiana the members of the admin-
istrative bodies enjoy a reputation for strict non-partisanship and of freedom from
political interference.
MUNICIPAL DEBT READJUSTMENT
communities within the state and even the credit standing of the state
itself.1 24  But even if unfamiliarity with local conditions be a meritorious
argument, a scheme of departmental organization with head and subordinate
agencies could keep in close touch with local conditions.
With regard to legal objections, it is unlikely that the validity of dele-
gating the necessary legislative functions to administrative agencies and con-
ferring upon them such executive and judicial powers as may be necessary
can be seriously challenged. The courts seem to have brought the doctrine
of non-delegability of powers to the basic requirement that the powers dele-
gated be such as the legislature could itself exercise or confer and that
adequate standards be set up to guide administrative officials in the applica-
tion of general policies to particular facts. 125  When all is said and done,
it would seem that legislative declarations of policies as limiting its agencies'
discretion may be very broad' 26 and often the test of valid delegation comes
down to the need for effective regulation. 27  All in all, the courts have had
little difficulty in upholding administrative supervision of local credit. 28
Admittedly, the home rule guaranties found in the constitutions of many
states120 may interpose barriers to the enactment of legislation setting up
centralized state administrative control over local finances. It must be
remembered, however, that these state guaranties of non-intervention are
either expressly or impliedly restricted to purely "municipal affairs",130 and
'See (Jan. 2, 1935) THE BOND BUYER 5.
'See BURDICK, LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1923) 60; FREUND, AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIvE LAW (1923) 118-24; Duff and Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non
Potest Delegari: A Maxim of Amnerican Constitutional Law (1928) 14 CORNELL L. Q.
168; Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 YA.E L. J. 892; Berle,
The Expansion of American Administrative Law (1917) 30 HARv. L. REv. 430.
'See BURDICK, op. cit. supra, note 125, at 153. See also the directions with regard
to the powers, granted to the Interstate Commerce Commission discussed in the Inter-
mountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476 (1914).
"Duff and Whiteside, cited supra note 125, at 196; note (1929) 27 MICH. L. REv.
558-559.
'
mSparkman v. County Budget Commission, 103 Fla. 242, 137 So. 809 (1931) (dele-
gation to county Budget Commission of power to approve local budgets and make
revision on basis of wisdom and expediency upheld) ; Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214,
172 N. E. 186 (1930) (delegation to State Tax Commission of power to review legality
of local tax levies upheld); Van Hess v. Board of Commissioners of St. Joseph
County, 190 Ind. 347, 129 N. E. 305 (1921) (delegation to State Board of Tax Com-
missioners of power to review local debt incurrence, as to legality and policy sustained.)
Accord: State ex rel. Fzeeland v. Evans, 197 Ind. 656, 150 N. E. 788 (1926) ; State
ex rel. Board of Commissioners of Kosciusko and Fulton Counties v. Leonard, 1.98
Ind. 356, 153 N. E. 777 (1926).
mARiz. CONST. Art. XIII; CAL. CONsT. Art. XI, §§ 8, 8Y2; COLO. CoNsT. Art. XX,§ 6; MD. CoNsT. Art. XI-A; MICH. CONST. Art. VIII, §§ 20, 21; MINN. CONST. Art.
IV, § 36; Mo. CONST. Art. IX, § 16; NEBi. CONsT. Art. XI; N. Y. CONsT. Art XII,§§ 2, 3; OHIO. CONST. Art. XVIII, §§ 2, 3, 7, 13; OKLA. CONST. Art. XVIII, § 3; Oax
CONST. Art. XI. § 2; PA. CONST. Art. XV, § 1; TEX. CONST. Art. XI, § 5; UTAH
CONST. Art. XI, § 5; WASH. CONST. Art. XI, § 10; Wis. CONST. Art. XI, § 3.
-1mMcGOLDRICK, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 1916-1930
(1933); McBAiN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 673-84 (1916).
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in matters of state-wide interest, state regulation is paramount. It is demon-
strable that local financial standing, affecting as it does the credit of both
other municipalities and the state, as well as the welfare of investors, some
of whom may be quasi-public institutions, is of general state concern and so
appropriately within the purview of state regulation. 13 1
But state constitutions differ in the nature and extent of the home rule
which they grant to municipalities. Some constitutions reserve to the
legislatures the power to restrict municipal indebtedness and to limit taxa-
tion and assessment.' 32 At least one state constitution provides that the
legislature shall supervise municipal deposits. 33  In these states the diffi-
culties incident to establishment of state administrative control over local
finance are minimized.
In other home rule states, the constitutional provisions constitute for-
midable hurdles. In Colorado, home-rule municipalities are given exclusive
control over issuance, refunding, and liquidation of municipal obligations,
the assessment of local property, as well as the levy and collection of taxes
for municipal purposes and over the creation, duties and qualifications of
municipal offices.' 3 4  In some other states, there are constitutional guar-
anties to preclude the performance of local functions by any others than local
officers.' 35 Perhaps such guaranties would preclude the establishment of
effective devices for administrative financial control. Some success in cir-
cumventing constitutional guaranties of this latter type has been achieved.
The New York 136 and Wisconsin constitutions 3 7 provide for election or
appointment by the authorities of counties, towns, and villages of officers per-
forming duties exercised by such political unit at the time of the adoption
of the state constitution. Despite provisions of this kind, the courts have
found a way to permit some degree of centralized financial control on the
theory that, when the state constitution was adopted, the local governments
failed to vest any official with a veto power over financial plans. 38  In the
case of offices temporary in character, an exceptive doctrine has grown up
'See Legislation (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 1317, 1322, 1323; Tooke, Construction of
Municipal Powers (1933) 7 TEmp. L. Q. 267, 274. For cases recognizing state-wide in-
terest in local credit in case of indebtedness regulation, see Tulsa v. Dabney, 133 Okia.
54, 270 "Pac. 1112 (1928); Van Hess v. Board of Commissioners of St. Joseph County,
190 Ind. 347, 129 N. E. 305 (1921).
'Aazz. CoNsT. Art. IX, § 8; MICH. CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 20; Mo. CONST. Art. X, § 1,
2; NEB. CONST. Art XI, § 4; N. Y. CoNsT. Art. XII, § 1; Oxio CoxST. Art. XVIII,§ 13; ORLA. CONST. Art, X, § 20; ORE. CON ST. Art. XI, § 5; TEX. CONsT. Art. III, § 52.
'CA. CONST. Art. XI. § 162.
":CoLo. CosT. Art. XX, § 6 (a), (e), (g).
11LEGis. (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rav. 1917, 1323 et. seq.
IN. Y. CONsT. Art. X, § 2.
VrWIS. CONsT. Art. XIII, § 9.
'-Cf. People v. Tax Commissioners, 174 N. Y. 417, 67 N. E. 69 (1903); People
v. Bradley, 207 N. Y. 592, 101 N. E. 766 (1913); Matter of Morgan v. Furey, 186
N. Y. 202, 78 N. E. 869 (1906) ; State v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673 (1913).
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based upon the argument that the state-appointed officer is non-local and so
falls without the scope of the constitutional restriction. 13 9 Under this doc-
trine, it is possible to sustain the validity of municipal receiverships instituted
because of default and at least temporary administrative supervision. So, too,
statutes permitting the local taxing process to be carried on by other than
the usual officers in their absence or their non-action come within this ex-
ceptive doctrine.140  Should the legislature get serious about the whole thing,
it is within the realm of possibility that new units together with new officials
may be substituted in individual instances.14 1
A number of state constitutions provide that the necessary officers of
specified classes of municipalities shall be elected by the voters of those
municipalities.142  Under these constitutions, the temporary character of the
public interest in state administrative supervision will very likely render such
supervision valid. At least seven constitutions forbid the state legislature to
delegate to any special commission the power to supervise municipal property
or funds or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever. 4 3
Taken literally, one might suppose these provisions would prevent any and
all commission control of local finance., It is said that these provisions were
originally adopted to prevent special discriminatory treatment of particular
municipalities. 1 44 Accordingly, it has been argued that such provisions were
not meant to apply to state commissions created for the avowed purpose of
permanently supervising the financial affairs of all municipalities. 45  It
should be noted that often the constitutionally prohibited class is "special
commissions." In at least one state, the courts have interpreted the pro-
hibited class of "special commissions" as excluding permanent commissions
with regularly defined duties.1 46  Of course, if one person is exercising the
'People v. Board of Supervisors, 170 N. Y. 105, 62 N. E. 1092 (1902) ; People v.
McDonald, 69 N. Y. 362 (1877); Strange v. Oconto Land Co., 136 Wis. 516, 117 N.
W. 1023 (1908) ; MCBAIN, THE LAW AND PRAC~E OF MuNICIPAL. HOME RULE (1916)
36.
... Strange v. Oconto Land Co., 136 Wis. 516, 117 N. W. 1023 (1908). Cf. 1 McQUIL-
LIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1931) 510, § 187.
"'McBAIN, op. cit. supra note 139, 46, 47.
'CAL. CoNsT. Art. II, § 2Y; Ky. CONST. § 160; LA. CONsT. Art. XIV, § 22; NEB.
CQNST. Art. IX, § 4; OHIO CONST. Art. X, § 1, Art. II, § 27; PA. CoNsT. Art. XIV,§§ 1, 2; VA. CONST. § 120; WASH. CoNsr. Amend. 12.
'CAL. CoNsT. Art. XI, § 13; COLO. CoNsr. Art. V, § 35; MONT. CoNsr. Art. V, §
36; PA. CoNsT. Art. III,§ 20; S. D. CONST. Art. III, § 26; UTAH CONST. Art. VI, § 29;
Wyo. CoNsT. Art. III, § 37.
2"McBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1916) 46, 47.
' Public Service Commission wv. City of Helena, 52 Mont. 527, 539, 159 Pac. 24,
27 (1916). But see Logan City v. Public- Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 536, 271 Pac.
961 (1928) ; People v. Loveland, 76 Colo. 188, 230 Pac. 399 (1924).
"'City of Denver v. Iliff, 38 Col. 357, 89 Pac. 823 (1906) ; City of Denver v. Landover,
33 Colo. 104, 80 Pac. 117 (1905); In re Fine and Excise Commission, 19 Colo. 482,
36 Pac. 234 (1894) ; In re Senate Bill, 12 Colo. 188, 21 Pac. 481 (1889).
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administrative supervision he hardly falls under the prohibition directed
against commissions.147
Finally, several states have constitutional provisions forbidding the state
legislature to impose taxes for municipal purposes. 48  This provision has
been held to preclude administrative control over local budgets and tax levies
beyond the determination of their legality.1 49  Just how far this latter type
of provision prevents centralized administrative control is difficult to de-
termine. On the theory that the state has a general interest in the financial
stability of its subdivisions inasmuch as their condition vitally affects the
state revenue system, the Washington court held that this type of constitu-
tional provision would prevent a State Tax Commission from reassessing
property for local taxation purposes, but not from reviewing local tax assess-
ments5 0 even though review, like reassessment, in the opinions of some is
tantamount to the imposition of local taxes.
Admittedly, these several types of home rule provisions are no small
obstacles in the path of the establishment of effective administrative super-
vision of local credit. But it should be remembered that in virtually every
instance the home rule guaranties resulted from "spoils legislation" by means
of which the state political machines mulcted the local units.' 51 The pro-
posed administrative supervision of local finance has as its avowed purpose
the conservation and not the spoliation of the resources of the state's units of
local government. And so it may be supposed that a court, cognizant of the
change in legislative motive, might be influenced strongly in its final con-
clusion.152  Perhaps, in the interest of the establishment of a central adminis-
trative supervision, having for its purpose the correction of local fiscal mis-
management and the better maintenance of municipal credit, the courts might
be willing to minimize the application of some of the constitutional re-
strictions to a central administrative supervision. They might be, at times,
quick to take advantage of a legal circumvention of a given home rule re-
striction where the legislature calls attention to pressing economic, social, and
political needs for centralized control. Perhaps the courts might even evade
certain prescribed restrictions against the interference of state officials or
commissions in local affairs and against imposition of local taxes by the state
on the ground that such intervention is directed toward objects not purely
municipal but state-wide in their import. All these are possibilities. Perhaps
4Kraus v. Philadelphia, 265 Pa. 425, 109 At. 226 1919).
'CAL. CONST. Art. XI, § 12; COLO. CONsT. Art. X, § 70; OKLA. CONST. Art. X, §
20; WASH. CONST. Art. XI, § 12.
"City of Ardmore v. Excise Board, 155 Okla. 126, 8 P. (2d.) 2 (1932).
'°State ex rel. King County v. Tax Commission, 174 Wash. 668, 26 P. (2d) 80 (1933).
m'McBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1916) 5-12;
LANCASTER, STATE SUPERVISION OF MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS (1923) 103-104..
"But see, Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 539, 27 Atl. 356 ((1893).
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they are little more. Perhaps the courts ought to feel constrained to give
"literal" effect to specific constitutional provisions. Too often we lose sight
of the fact that the twilight zone between "literal" and "substantial" is often
an area, the soil content of which is "opinion." "
One must remember that, whatever the difficulties in the way, preservation
of municipal credit is of great social and economic importance. Granting the
importance of the problem, state constitutions may and ought to be amended
to permit of administrative supervision of local credit and fiscal affairs. After
all, no such difficulties as attach to the amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion will have to be hurdled in amending state constitutions.
